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I. Introduction 
SEVERAL RECENT ACTIONS at the federal level represent a fun- 
damental shift in the role that the nation's highest level of govern- 
ment will play in pressing for "a decent home and suitable living 
environment for all Americans."' Congress acted in 1981 to reduce 
federal spending for housing by nearly 50 percent and to shift the 
emphasis of federal programs to subsidies for existing housing 
rather than for the construction of new housing units.' In October 
*Portions of this article were prepared for an Information Bulletin to be 
published by the Urban Consortium for distribution to the chief executives of the 
nation's largest cities and urban counties. 
1. Housing Act of 1949,42 U.S.C. 8 1441 (1976). The declaration of national 
housing policy contained in Section 2 of the National Housing Act of 1949 
provides an apt preface for this article and an interesting counterpoint to  recent 
federal housing activity: 
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the 
Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing 
production and related community development sufficient to remedy the se- 
rious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate 
housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization 
as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environ- 
ment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and 
redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, 
and security of the Nation. 
2. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 
97-35,95 Stat. 384 (1981). This legislation, signed by President Reagan on Aug. 
13,1981, provides funding of $18.087 billion for 156,250 units of assisted housing. 
This contrasts with Pub. L. No. 96-526,94 Stat. 3044 (1980), signed by President 
Carter on Dec. 15,1980, which provided $30.87 billion for 280,000 housing units. 
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of 1981, The President's Commission on Housing recommended 
"that the primary federal project for helping low-income families 
achieve decent housing be a consumer-oriented housing assistance 
grant.") Simultaneously, the United States Department of Hous- 
ing and Urban Development (HUD) proposed radical changes in 
its legislative program for fiscal year 1983; HUD recommended a 
sharply reduced subsidized housing program that would eliminate 
three housing rehabilitation programs and replace them with a 
block grant, establish a direct rental subsidy program for the poor, 
and provide a very modest new construction program for the 
e l d e r l ~ . ~  These actions contrast markedly with the federal housing 
programs of the 1970s and early 1980s. For fiscal year 1981, for 
example, Congress approved funding for 280,000 assisted housing 
units, fully half of which were to be newly constructed or substan- 
tially rehabilitated hou~ing .~  
The federal government's changing role in housing parallels a 
change in federal spending for many other domestic  program^.^ 
These changes represent a shift in the course of the federal system, 
centered on the national government's power to tax and to spend 
public funds for the general welfare. 
This article begins with an examination of the evolution of the 
federal government's predominant role in collecting and spending 
revenues for social programs, including housing. It traces the 
growth of federal spending, and the evolution of federally assisted 
programs for housing. It continues with an analysis of the trend 
toward block grants and housing allowances, and concludes by 
commenting on this trend's effect on the future of housing pro- 
grams for households with limited incomes. 
11. Evolution of the Federal Power to 
Collect and Spend Revenues for 
the General Welfare 
Article I ,  Section 8 of the United States Constitution gave Con- 
gress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and 
3. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION N HOUSING, INTERIM REPORT, at p. 3 (1980). 
4. HUD Transmittal of its Legislative Program for the 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget by Donald I. Hovde, Acting 
Secretary (Sept. 15, 1981). 
5. Pub. L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044 (1980). 
6. In 1981, Congress designed block grant legislation to consolidate categorical 
programs in the health, education, and social services fields. These programs 
generally reduce the level of federal assistance available, transfer greater author- 
ity to state governments for the administration of the programs, and reduce 
federal regulation of the programs. 
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excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and 
general welfare of the United States." The Founding fathers hotly 
debated the meaning of the Section 8 general welfare provision. 
Jefferson and Madison argued that the power to tax was limited to 
promoting the general welfare under powers specifically granted 
by other clauses of the Constitution. Their view of the federal 
government, as one of enunciated powers, suggested that Con- 
gress could not tax and spend for just any broad general welfare 
purposes that it might choose to promote.' Hamilton disagreed. 
He held that Congress could tax and spend for the general welfare 
as defined by Congress i t~e l f .~  
This debate over the meaning of Article I, Section 8 continued 
for over a century and a half until it was decisively resolved by the 
Supreme Court during the New Deal.9 In upholding the constitu- 
tionality of the Social Security Act, the Court adopted the Hamil- 
tonian view that the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to 
spend for the general welfare was broad, and not narrowly limited 
to the furtherance of specific, enumerated powers. The Court also 
defined the general welfare power as flexible and changing, rather 
than fixed by the framers of the Constitution: "Nor is the concept 
of general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a 
century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of 
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time."1° 
This dynamic view of the spending power was essential to the 
ability of Congress to enact the sweeping social programs that were 
initiated in the post-Depression period. At issue was the federal 
government's authority to raise and distribute resources to solve 
problems that had previously been regarded as local rather than 
national in scope. Even Hamilton had agreed that the powers of 
taxation and appropriation extended only to matters of national, 
as distinguished from local, welfare. This view was reinforced by 
commentator Story who wrote: "The Constitution was, from its 
very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national govern- 
ment, of special and enunciated powers, and not of general and 
unlimited powers."11 In Helvering, the Court concluded that the 
several states could not deal effectively with problems such as 
relief for the elderly and unemployed. 
7 .  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (J. Madison); T. JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA PROTEST 
(1825). 
8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (A. Hamilton). 
9. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1935). 
10. Id.,  at 641. 
11. J .  STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION F THE UNITED STATES, 
§ 909 (5th ed. 1891). 
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State and local governments are often lacking in the resources that are neces- 
sary to finance an adequate program of security for the aged. . . . Apart from 
the failure of resources, states and local governments are at times reluctant to 
increase heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of 
placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared to 
neighbors or competit~rs.'~ 
The Great Depression, the Roosevelt Administration, and cases 
like Helvering v. Davis set the stage for the creation by Congress of 
housing programs for low-income Americans. Prior to Helvering, 
Congress had limited its actions in the housing field to programs 
designed to strengthen credit institutions and make mortgage 
financing available to a larger number of home buyers. 
In a major departure, two years after the Helvering decision, 
Congress created the Public Housing Program for low-income 
tenants. The 1937 United States Housing Act made available 
direct federal subsidies to allow local governmental bodies to 
develop, own and manage housing for low-income people and to 
encourage the replacement of slums with newly constructed 
housing.13 This post-Depression housing legislation was motivated 
as much by a desire to create jobs in a fragile economy as to provide 
shelter for those in need. Both purposes, however, would have 
withstood the judicial test for determining whether Congressional 
legislation properly pursued the nation's general welfare. In fact, 
in no case to date has the Supreme Court held any federal grant 
program unconstitutional for pursuing a local purpose, rather than 
the national welfare. 
A recent Supreme Court ruling illustrates the extent to which 
Congress can go in funding local projects, in the interest of the 
national welfare. In Fullilove v. Klutznik,14 the Court held consti- 
tutional the grant of federal monies for local public works projects, 
under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. The Fullilove 
case describes a federal government that for practical purposes, 
seems complete and without limitation in its power to tax and 
spend for the general welfare. The housing programs that have 
emanated from Congress, beginning with the 1937 U.S. Housing 
Act, are illustrative of the extent to which the federal government 
has been willing to spend public monies to assist local programs in 
pursuit of "national" general welfare objectives. 
12. Id. ,  at 8 644. 
13. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. 88 1401-30 (1976). 
14. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
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111. The Evolution of Federally 
Funded Housing Programs 
As Congress considers enactment of the sweeping changes en- 
visioned by the recent recommendations of HUD and the Presi- 
dent's Housing Commission, it will be deciding where next to turn 
on a path it has been travelling for over fifty years. Congress began 
during the fiscal crisis of the early 1930s by creating the Home Loan 
Bank System, establishing a system of deposit insurance, and 
creating a secondary market for mortgages threatened with 
forecl~sure. '~ It continued its concern for the mortgage market by 
passing the National Housing Act of 1934 which established a 
system of mortgage insurance through the Federal Housing Ad- 
ministration. This Act had the effect of liberalizing private mort- 
gage credit terms and greatly spurred housing construction by 
making long-term, low down-payment mortgages available. The 
Act also created secondary market facilities for purchasing govern- 
ment insured mortgages and returning capital to originating lend- 
ers for additional mortgage lending. 
It was against this backdrop that Congress acted in 1937 to create 
the Public Housing Program. Twelve years later, Congress created 
a separate slum clearance initiative that became known as the 
Urban Renewal Program.16 Under the Housing Act of 1949, Con- 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
15. In 1931, President Hoover convened the White House Conference on 
Home Building and Homeownership to look into the emerging crisis in mortgage 
lending. At the time, there was little unanimity of opinion over whether govern- 
ment should intervene. In 1932, the Home Loan Bank System was created; by 
that time, symptoms of financial collapse has spread throughout the home lending 
market. Through regional banks, the Home Loan Bank Board was authorized to 
make loans to member savings and loan institutions which, in time, were required 
to invest heavily in real estate mortgages. Later, a system of deposit insurance was 
established, restoring public confidence in banking institutions. This early hous- 
ing-related legislation was borne out of national calamity and went far toward 
revitalizing and reshaping the system of mortgage credit and home insurance that 
had been in use. 
In an ironic parallel a half-century later, President Reagan's Commission on 
Housing called for an extensive restructuring of the home financing system to 
ensure that adequate funds are available for residential lending. In a draft 
position paper entitled Financing the Housing Needs of the 1980s (issued January, 
1982), the Commission noted that the changes needed today may be as wide- 
spread as those made during the Roosevelt Administration that enabled savings 
and loan associations to become the primary source of home mortgage lending. 
The Commission reported that "a broader based and more resilient system of 
housing credit is needed to finance the housing needs of the 1980s." It recom- 
mended giving broader powers to thrift institutions so they can offer checking 
accounts to business, invest more widely in consumer, commercial and agricultu- 
ral loans, and expand their real estate activities. 
16. Housing Act of 1949, Title I ,  42 U.S.C. 5 1441 (1976). 
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gress provided direct subsidies to local governmental agencies to 
allow them to clear blighted areas and provide sites at economi- 
cally feasible prices for private enterprise to build moderate cost 
housing and other commercial, industrial and public facilities. The 
Housing Act of 1954 added conservation and rehabilitation pro- 
grams to broaden urban renewal into a more comprehensive tool." 
Local governments were also required, beginning in 1954, to adopt 
master plans and a variety of local codes, to remain eligible for 
urban renewal subsidies. 
In 1959, Congress extended the availability of housing subsidies 
to nonpublic entities for the first time. The Housing Act of 1959 
created the Section 202 Program, providing direct loans to private, 
nonprofit entities to develop housing for the elderly and 
handicapped.'* Congress first provided these loans at the interest 
rate then paid on the federal debt, but later wrote the rate down to 
three percent. This was the first congressional expression of the 
need for direct subsidy to accommodate households with incomes 
above the public-housing level. 
The momentum picked up with the Housing Act of 1961, which 
created the Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate 
Program.Ig For the first time, private developers were made eligi- 
ble, along with nonprofits and cooperatives, for direct federal 
loans; interest rates were established by the amount paid on the 
federal debt. In the Housing Act of 1965, Congress allowed sub- 
sidies to be geared to individual family needs for the first time; the 
Rent Supplement Program was created, under which eligible 
tenants paid no more than 25 percent of their income for rent and a 
flexible federal subsidy covered the difference ." In 1965, Congress 
also created the Section 23 leasing program enabling local public 
housing agencies to subsidize units in existing h~using.~ '  That same 
year HUD was created as a new cabinet-level agency. In 1966, 
Congress created the Model Cities Program, an attempt to coor- 
dinate physical improvement activities with social programs in 
defined neighborhoods.* 
17. Housing Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 9 1450 (1976). 
18. Housing Act of 1959, 12 U.S.C. 9 1701q (1976 and Supp. I11 1979). 
19. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 9 101(a) (6), 75 Stat. 149, 150 
- . .  . .  (1962). 
20. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Title I, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 
79 Stat. 451 (1966), 12 U.S.C. 9 1701s (1976). 
21. Id., at 5 103(a), 79 Stat. 451, 455119661. 
22. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Title I, 
42 U.S.C. 99 3301-3313 (1976). 
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A half century of federal housing legislation was combined and 
significantly expanded in the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968.= Congress created the Section 235 Program, under 
which subsidies were made available to enable lower income fami- 
lies to purchase homes." The 1968 Act also created the Section 236 
Program to provide rental housing for families whose incomes 
exceeded public housing eligibility limits.15 Under Section 236, an 
interest subsidy was provided; HUD could write the interest on the 
mortgage down to one percent. The Neighborhood Development 
Program was also created in 1968, giving a new slant to Urban 
Renewal by encouraging steady, more flexible, and comprehen- 
sive performance under Urban Renewal programs.26 In addition, 
the 1968 legislation also extended and expanded Model Cities, 
Urban Renewal, and a variety of other grant-in-aid programs and 
authorized large appropriations for Rent Supplements and Public 
Housing. 
With this new legislation, private developers were fully en- 
franchised by Congress. The flow of federal housing subsidy funds 
was henceforth to be triggered by applications from private sector 
developers, except for public housing projects, which remained 
within the control of local housing authorities. Local renewal and 
redevelopment agencies worked in partnership with private de- 
velopers providing sites and public improvements and otherwise 
aiding project feasibility in urban renewal areas. Outside renewal 
areas, the ground rules were much less clear. Local governments 
often initiated the process whereby private developers applied to 
HUD for housing subsidies. Frequently, however, localities found 
themselves responding to unsolicited initiatives by developers to 
build low- and moderate-income housing with federal assistance. 
The Nixon moratorium on housing programs and runaway infla- 
tion in the early 1970s spurred a reexamination of federal develop- 
ment and housing programs and led to the passage of greatly 
revised legislation in 1974. The Housing and Community Develop- 
ment Act of that year eliminated most categorical urban develop- 
ment programs, including Urban Renewal, and replaced them 
with a community development block grant for eligible localities 
and urban c o u n t i e ~ . ~  The Act provided for the phasing out of most 
23. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968). 
24. Id. at 477. 
25. Id. at 498. 
26. Id. at 518. 
~ -~ ~~~ - .
27. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 
88 Stat. 633 (1976). 
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current housing subsidy programs and created the new, highly 
flexible Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Pr~gram. '~  
The Housing and Community Development Act required locali- 
ties to develop a Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) as a part of their 
application for Community Development Block Grant assistance. 
These HAPS were then to be used by HUD in allocating housing 
subsidies and in reviewing developers' applications; all such ap- 
plications were to be referred to the local chief executive for review 
and comment regarding whether the application was consistent 
with the municipality's HAP. While this procedure gave local 
officials a greater degree of control over the construction of feder- 
ally assisted housing, the private sector was still heavily relied on to 
initiate applications for new construction and substantial rehabili- 
tation projects. 
Section 8 was not just a new construction and substantial reha- 
bilitation program. Local public agencies were made eligible to 
apply for set-asides of Section 8 units to subsidize the rents of 
tenants in existing housing complying with local housing stan- 
dards. This Existing Section 8 Program was later expanded to give 
these local agencies set-asides of Section 8 funds, with higher 
allowable rental levels, to enable the owners of rental housing to 
complete a moderate level of rehabilitation. Under this program, 
local housing authorities and other eligible public agencies became 
the vehicles through which applications were made to HUD for 
housing assistance to subsidize rents and effect moderate rehabil- 
itation in existing housing. The expansion complemented the lo- 
calities' recently acquired authority to use their Community De- 
velopment Block Grant funds to initiate rehabilitation loan and 
grant programs to stimulate the preservation and revitalization of 
privately-owned homes and rental housing and to launch neigh- 
borhood preservation programs in both residential and commer- 
cial areas. 
In designing the Section 8 new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation program, Congress was attempting to provide a 
subsidy sufficiently deep and flexible to respond to double digit 
inflation. An alarming number of Section 236 projects had become 
financially troubled because the interest subsidy employed by the 
program was simply not flexible or deep enough to keep pace with 
rapidly rising energy and maintenance costs. Under Section 8, 
Congress agreed to pay the difference between 25 percent of a 
28. Id. Title 11, 8 201(a). 
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tenant's income and rents designed to respond to actual market 
conditions. The flexibility of Section 8 allowed avoidance of the 
cost overrun problem of Section 236, but caused increasing anxiety 
in Congress as costs continued to escalate, increasing the federal 
contribution and building pressure on the legislators to look for 
alternative subsidy mechanisms such as the Housing Block Grant 
and Housing Allowance approaches. 
IV. Reexamining Federal 
Housing Programs 
By 1980, these federal housing programs had become sufficiently 
controversial to inspire Congress to order a comprehensive ex- 
amination of the feasibility of a housing assistance block grant 
program. Congress stipulated that the examination, to be con- 
ducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
study the feasibility of replacing the current federal housing pro- 
grams with a block grant for housing.29 The order reflected a 
congressional response to heightened criticism of the current pro- 
grams as too costly, overly complex and too highly regulated. 
Congress sought to investigate other alternatives that would give 
localities greater flexibility, lower the cost of housing assistance, 
and simplify the method of administering the program. Under a 
block grant method of distributing federal housing assistance, 
municipalities and other recipients of block grant funds would play 
a greatly increased role in planning and implementing programs 
for the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of low- and 
moderate-income housing. 
Housing block grant legislation would signal a fundamental shift 
in the attitude of Congress as to how some or all federal housing 
programs are to be administered. The degree of federal prescrip- 
. tion would be lowered, administrative control loosened, and the 
allocation of funds made more directly to local and state govern- 
ments. The significance of a shift to housing block grants can be 
illustrated by a review of two recent proposals to use block grants 
as the method of delivering federal housing assistance. 
A. Housing Block Grant Proposals of the 1970s 
Two formal proposals to create a housing block grant program 
emanated separately from Congress, in 1973, and from the Ford 
29. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Title 11, Pub. L. NO. 
96399, 9 215, 94 Stat. 1614, (1980). 
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Administration in 1976. These two proposals had a great deal in 
common. House Report 10036, commonly known as the Barrett- 
Ashley proposal, and a report prepared by HUD Secretary Carla 
Hills shared these basic notions concerning housing block grants: 
1. Funds would be allocated to local governments and to states 
based on a statistically measurable formula. 
2. Large cities and urban counties would be entitled to receive 
allocations directly, with funds for smaller jurisdictions being 
separately allocated either through state governments or by 
HUD. 
3. Applications for housing funds would be simplified, federal 
reviews of the application narrowed, and emphasis placed on 
performance reviews. 
4. Funds could be used for virtually all types of housing subsidy 
payments, with an emphasis on the housing needs of lower 
income households, and with responsibility for planning and 
administering housing programs centered at the local and 
state level. 
5. Compliance with other federal statutes such as fair housing, 
civil rights and environmental legislation would be required. 
These common characteristics spring from the underlying na- 
ture of block grant legislation, and, with minor deviations, are 
likely to appear in most housing block grant proposals. Basic to the 
block grant concept are the elimination of undue federal interfer- 
ence in local decision making and the reduction of the difficulties, 
delays, and costs inherent in federal processing. These refinements 
will in turn result in greater flexibility at the local level in program 
design, greater local responsibility for the success of individual 
projects, and the hope of achieving greater efficiency through the 
coordination of federal, state, and local resources. 
As likely as these characteristics are to appear in housing block 
grant legislation, there are several major issues about which there 
is little historical or conceptual agreement. Most significant of 
these is the specific method of allocating funds to the local or state 
level. 
B . The Allocation Dilemma 
The Barrett-Ashley proposal was based on direct allocations of 
entitlement amounts to local and state governments. It authorized 
entitlement communities to use a certain percentage of their pro- 
jected annual allocation for outlays in the current year. It left the 
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locality free to choose to make short- or long-term commitments of 
block grant funds. Multiyear commitments could be made to se- 
cure long-term financing required for new construction and sub- 
stantial rehabilitation, subject to certain limitations controlling the 
amount of deferred payments in any one year. The administration 
in 1973 opposed the Barrett-Ashley proposal because of its 
"emphasis" on new construction; it suggested instead greater con- 
sideration of direct cash assistance and allowances. The 1976 Hills 
proposal was also based on the direct allocation of an entitlement 
amount to local and state governments. Hills would have used the 
newly evolved concept of "budget authority" to provide the long- 
term commitment of funds necessary to insure the financial success 
of programs over time. 
The concept of budget authority is basic to a full understanding 
of the dilemma that faces Congress in deciding how best to allocate 
housing block grants. In 1974, Congress required, for the first 
time, that HUD include in its budget submissions the cost of 
assisted projects over the full life of the federal government's 
commitment to provide ass i s t an~e .~  This long-term budget au- 
thority resolved the long ignored issue of how subsidy commit- 
ments were to be guaranteed. Prior to 1974, HUD had simply 
requested contract authority to meet obligations under subsidy 
commitments that fell due in any given year. Today, HUD is 
required to include in its budget both the authority that is needed 
to pay the long-term costs of housing assistance contracts to be 
awarded during the fiscal year, as well as the amount of contract 
authority that is to be expended during that fiscal year. Under any 
housing block grant program, Congress must then decide how 
much budget authority to allocate to eligible recipients, the length 
of that budget authority, and the amount of contract authority (as a 
percent of budget authority) available in any given year. 
The 1976 Hills proposal recommended that the housing block 
grant authorization legislation specify the amount of budget au- 
thority that would become available at the beginning of each fiscal 
year. It further recommended that congressional appropriations 
release budget authority for three years and make that authority 
available to localities until expended, up to fifty-five years. The 
Hills proposal would have set an upper limit on annual contract 
authority allocated to a locality; only this amount could be spent in 
30. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Title IV, 31 
U.S.C. 5 1301 (1976). 
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any given year. This would allow, but not require, localities to 
expend their three year budget authority in no fewer than ten 
years. 
Hills reasoned that this technique would create an incentive for 
localities to develop projects for the subsidy or repair of existing 
housing, rather than new construction or substantial rehabilita- 
tion. Existing housing programs have lower per unit cost, require 
shorter contract terms, and allow localities more latitude to use 
fully their maximum annual spending allowances. The longer term 
contracts required for financing new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation would require localities to spread their available 
budget authority over a longer period than the ten-year minimum; 
this would tend to discourage localities from using their allocations 
for these longer term commitments. 
The Hills proposal was advanced toward the end of the Ford 
Administration. It was criticized by the Office of Management and 
Budget as preempting a discussion, under broader welfare reform 
proposals, of the prospects of meeting the housing needs of the 
poor, partially or completely, through a cash transfer system. This 
criticism, other technical difficulties, and the defeat of President 
Ford combined to curtail discussion of the Hills block grant recom- 
mendation. The Hills proposal received considerable reexamina- 
tion after Governor Reagan's election in 1980 and his appointment 
of former Secretary Hills to chair his transition housing policy task 
force, and subsequently to serve as the Vice Chairman of his 
Housing Commission. 
As Secretary Hills candidly admitted, the method she recom- 
mended of allocating budget and contract authority tended to 
favor the use of federal housing funds for maintaining and revital- 
izing existing housing. The Barrett-Ashley allocation mechanism 
was criticized as being too oriented toward new construction. 
These proposals illustrate the difficulties that face Congress in 
addressing the threshold issue of how to allocate federal spending 
authority to lower levels of government. They also demonstrate 
how the allocation method chosen by Congress tends to bias a 
block grant program in favor of one set of housing programs over 
another. 
V. The Various Designs of a 
Block Grant for Housing 
Out of the dilemma that is built into the allocation mechanism have 
evolved four separate program models, distinguishable primarily 
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by the method each uses to allocate housing assistance, and by 
what, and how much, each proposes to allocate. 
1. Short-Term, All Purpose Grant. Under the first program 
model, only short-term authority would be allocated to block grant 
recipients, which they would then be authorized to spend im- 
mediately. Such authority tends to encourage housing programs 
that require short-term contractual commitments, such as one- 
time land acquisition or capital grants, one-to-five year interest 
reduction arrangements or rental assistance contracts, or one-time 
interest reduction payments. As an all purpose grant, it is generally 
intended to replace all other federal housing assistance programs 
and to give recipients great control over the shape of local pro- 
grams. Short-term authority can be converted to long-term com- 
mitments to support new construction and substantial rehabilita- 
tion; however, localities would be discouraged from making such 
commitments because they require the use of all, or a substantial 
portion, of the grant to support a relatively few units. 
2. Long-Term, All Purpose Grant. The 1976 Hills proposal fits 
this second model; it proposes the allocation of long-term budget 
authority to block grant recipients for use in a wide range of 
housing activities. Long-term authority more easily allows for 
payment of debt service over a longer period and is equally adapt- 
able to a range of shorter term uses. This model usually carries an 
arbitrary ceiling on annual contract authority to limit the amount 
for which the federal treasury will be obligated in any one year. As 
illustrated by the Hills proposal, this annual contract authority 
ceiling can be manipulated to encourage localities to favor one 
type of housing activity over another. 
3 .  Allocation of Budget Authority Under Current Programs. 
This model suggests that current federal housing programs be left 
in place as designed by Congress. A formula could be used to 
allocate to recipient jurisdictions their share of budget authority; 
they could then design housing strategies by choosing from full 
range of HUD programs. This transfers full control over program 
selection and mix to the local or state level, while Congress and 
HUD retain responsibility for program standards. 
4. Limited Purpose Block Grant. This final model would ter- 
minate fewer of the existing federal subsidy programs, and use a 
limited purpose grant to allow recipients greater flexibility to de- 
sign replacement programs. Proposals in this category normally set 
their sights on HUD's traditional rehabilitation programs and 
recommend their replacement by a Housing Conservation Block 
Grant or Rehabilitation Block Grant Program. These proposals 
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illustrate the relative nature of the block grant concept. By propos- 
ing to replace a smaller group of federal housing programs, they 
are less "blocky" than full-purpose grants in proportion to the 
number of initiatives they supplant. The limited purpose approach 
is often suggested as a method of making the transition to a 
full-purpose model. Limited purpose grants can, of course, be 
either long- or short-term. One interesting adaptation of the lim- 
ited purpose model would combine, or coordinate, welfare allow- 
ances, currently administered by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, with HUD's existing housing programs. This 
approach is, in one respect, the "blockiest" of the block grant 
proposals in that it cuts across departmental lines and aggregates 
both housing and social service programs. This illustrates again, 
the wide range of options available to Congress. 
VI. A Host of Considerations for 
Congressional Attention 
The allocation dilemma and the wide variety of available pro- 
gram options are only two of several critical issues that should be 
watched carefully as Congress considers enacting housing block 
grant legislation. In addition to the amount of funding and the 
method of allocation, key decisions must be made regarding the 
nature of the formula to be used to allocate available funds, the 
range of policy options recipients will have, the administrative and 
fiscal requirements that Congress will impose, and the degree of 
support that will be made available for the new housing ventures 
designed by recipient jurisdictions. Taken together, these con- 
cerns can be grouped and described as follows: 
A. How Extensive Will Block 
Grant Resources Be? 
The cost of housing will not be reduced by the form that federal 
housing assistance takes. Advocates of the block grant approach 
often contend that increased flexibility will lead to the invention of 
more highly leveraged or less expensive methods of meeting the 
housing needs of lower income households. Will this contention 
lead to a reduction in the overall dollar commitment of the federal 
government to housing? If so, will the promises of greater effi- 
ciency and innovation of the block grant concept be meaningful in 
the face of the increasingly high cost of constructing, rehabilitat- 
ing, and maintaining housing? 
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B .  What Type of Financial Authority 
Will Be Allocated? 
Will Congress make a sufficiently long-term allocation of budget 
authority to justify the time and expense involved in gearing up for 
the responsibility assumed by recipient jurisdictions? Is that 
budget authority, and any restriction on annual contract authority, 
geared to allow recipients the full range of housing options avail- 
able under current programs? If not, what financial and program- 
matic biases can be found in the method Congress chooses to 
allocate budget and contract authority? These biases must be 
understood and respected before recipient jurisdictions develop 
an administrative structure to assume block grant program respon- 
sibility. 
C .  How Will Block Grant 
Resources Be Allocated? 
What formula will be used to determine the percent of total block 
grant resources that will be allocated to each entitled jurisdiction? 
Will the factors used in the formula be limited to poverty and 
housing quality-the most fundamental indices of housing need- 
or will they include other factors, such as housing costs and scar- 
city, population, and renttincome imbalance? Will the resources 
be divided between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas? 
Will the capacity of recipient jurisdiction figure in the allocation 
process? Will a population threshold be used to determine which 
localities are entitled to receive funds directly and which must 
apply through their states or to HUD for discretionary funds? 
Given all these considerations, what level of annual funding is 
likely? How many units of housing will that size grant assist in each 
locality, given local priorities? Given that level of funding, what 
amount of preparation, administrative structure, and commitment 
of other resources does the program warrant? 
D.  What Is the Effective Range of 
Policy Options Allowed? 
Does the proposed block grant program offer recipient jurisdic- 
tions measurably increased flexibility in designing housing pro- 
grams that respond to local needs? Has Congress included a broad 
range of eligible activities, or created instead a limited purpose 
program? Will the recipient be obligated to divert a substantial 
portion of the funds to honor commitments made by HUD or the 
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recipient under pre-existing housing subsidy programs? Has Con- 
gress required that funds be targeted primarily to benefit a limited 
population group or a defined type of geographical area? How 
specifically has Congress defined the federal purposes for which 
block grant funds must be expended? How does that definition 
compare with local and state priorities? 
E .  What Degree of Administrative 
Control Will HUD Exercise? 
How extensive will the application for block grant funds be? Will 
HUD have authority to require changes in priorities, programs, 
and policy decisions, or will its review be narrower and more 
expeditious? Will federal cost and quality standards be imposed on 
local projects? What financial management and fiscal control stan- 
dards will be used? How will Congress require that recipient 
jurisdictions comply with other federal statutory and judicial man- 
dates regarding fair housing, affirmative action, environmental 
quality, intergovernmental coordination, labor standards and 
energy conservation? What type of program reporting and per- 
formance review system will HUD use to determine recipient 
compliance with minimum federal requirements? What sanctions 
will HUD be empowered to use in the event that recipients fail to 
comply with these and other criteria? 
F .  What Other Support Will Be Offered by Congress? 
If Congress delegates responsibility for program design to reci- 
pient jurisdictions, will it lessen its commitment to providing other 
needed assistance? What assistance and guidance will HUD pro- 
vide to insure that projects receiving block grant funds will be 
secure from the long-term risks associated with low-income hous- 
ing that have been a paramount concern under current HUD 
housing programs? What financial support, such as conventional 
and long-term financing, mortgage insurance, secondary mortgage 
market support, tax incentives, and inducements to states to pro- 
vide financial assistance will be provided? What technical stan- 
dards and assistance will HUD provide? Will cost and quality 
standards be imposed or recommended? Will management plans 
be required, management standards set, and post-occupancy 
monitoring performed? Will a federal staff or federal funds be 
made available for these and other technical responsibilities that 
are proposed to be delegated to recipient jurisdictions? 
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VII. The Impact on State and Local 
Government of a Shift to a 
Housing Block Grant Program 
The impact on state and local governments of a shift to a block 
grant approach to allocating federal housing assistance will, at a 
minimum, be significant; if that shift is to a full-purpose block grant 
program, and if most current subsidy programs are eliminated, 
that impact will be extreme. To date, the construction and rehabil- 
itation of low- and moderate-income housing has been financed 
principally through a limited number of carefully prescribed fed- 
eral housing programs administered and controlled directly by 
HUD. Responsibility for the design of these programs has been 
federal; Congress has carefully established priorities for the ex- 
penditure of federal housing dollars and has developed a tight 
administrative framework for receiving, reviewing and approving 
proposals for the commitment of federal housing resources. The 
federal bureaucracy has retained direct responsibility for meeting 
other national objectives such as fair housing, environmental pro- 
tection and affirmative action; it is charged with coordinating 
housing subsidy programs with the functioning of the all-important 
secondary mortgage market and with HUD insurance programs. 
The degree to which housing block grant legislation transfers 
these current federal responsibilities to the local and state level will 
define the impact of such legislation on lower levels of govern- 
ment. The greater the flexibility and control given to states and 
municipalities, and the larger the number of federal programs that 
are eliminated, the more political, technical and financial responsi- 
bility local and state officials will have. Their role will be propor- 
tionately increased in establishing priorities, devising methods of 
leveraging bank participation, insuring compliance with design 
and quality standards, and otherwise monitoring and controlling 
private developers. This consideration gives rise to a series of 
additional issues that must be seriously examined by Congress if it 
considers enacting housing block grant legislation. 
A. The Impact of Housing Assistance 
Block Grant Legislation on the 
State and Local Political Process 
A housing block grant program is likely to expand the policy 
options available to state and local legislatures in determining what 
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housing objectives ought to be met with federal assistance. These 
legislators are likely to have more control in deciding whether to 
pursue new construction, substantial rehabilitation, housing con- 
servation, or rental assistance programs, and what the mix among 
these programs ought to be. They may be given greater latitude by 
Congress to decide which households will be eligible for assistance, 
and whether to target greater amounts to the elderly, the hand- 
icapped, low-income households or minority populations. If some 
or all of the current federal housing programs are discontinued, 
state and local legislative bodies will be faced with hard decisions 
as to whether to use the block grant revenues to continue them. In 
the extreme event that public housing modernization funds and 
operating subsidies for public housing and troubled federally 
assisted projects are folded into the block grant program, legisla- 
tive leaders must decide whether or how to preserve the integrity 
of existing subsidized projects through the use of block grant 
funds. 
There may be a new level of technical, as well as political, 
complexity to the decisions local and state legislators must make. If 
state or local laws and ordinances must be passed to create housing 
initiatives to replace current federal subsidy programs, then these 
legislators will be required to develop considerable expertise in 
housing finance and development. They will have to learn the 
intricacies of the mortgage market, understand underwriting 
criteria, and determine how to create local programs that can take 
advantage of innovative mortgage techniques, private mortgage 
assistance, tax-exempt financing authorized by state legislation, 
and whatever federal insurance and secondary market programs 
remain after the block grant program is established. 
If Congress were to decide to grant wide discretion to municipal- 
ities and states to create new subsidy programs to replace all or a 
significant part of the current federally created programs, the 
political and technical complexity of the task would be enormous. 
This complexity decreases in proportion to the number of federal 
programs retained by Congress; it also decreases as the amount of 
revenue included in the block grant program declines and the 
range of eligible uses for such revenue decreases. 
An additional complication overlays this increased political re- 
sponsibility. A variety of federal statutes and judicial decisions 
create standards that must be complied with in spending federal 
housing funds. The environmental, fair housing and labor stan- 
dards, and the affirmative action requirements enforced by HUD 
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will not necessarily be affected or diminished by housing block 
grant legislation. The much debated site and neighborhood stan- 
dards, for example, are used by HUD to evaluate the compliance 
of Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation proj- 
ects with established fair housing laws and judicial decisions." 
Although other techniques may be devised to comply with these 
legislative and judicial criteria, the criteria themselves do not 
disappear with the enactment of block grant legislation, for all its 
emphasis on local control and flexibility. These additional feder- 
ally and judicially prescribed standards, then, must also be under- 
stood and complied with by recipients in carrying out their block 
grant funded housing programs, unless the standards are relaxed 
by Congress. 
The potential political impact of a housing block grant program 
indicates how radically the traditional role of local and state gov- 
ernment could be changed in the housing field. Under current 
housing subsidy programs, Congress has presented legislators with 
a clear statement of federal housing objectives, completely de- 
signed federal housing programs, and an administrative structure 
to oversee the implementation of federal programs at the state and 
local level. Since federal law is relied on in lieu of local and state 
law, legislators have been presented with fewer policy choices in 
the implementation of housing programs than may be true in the 
future. 
B .  The Legal Impact of 
Housing Block Grants 
The housing block grant program may create unforeseen legal 
problems to the extent that it gives wide discretion for the expendi- 
ture of federal assistance to state and local governments. The block 
grant concept is based on the philosophical principal of allowing 
recipient jurisdictions wide discretion in deciding how to spend 
federal assistance. The wider this discretion, the less directive the 
31. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 8 245 (1976), requires 
that all executive departments and agencies administer their programs relating to 
housing in an "affirmative" manner so as to further the objectives of the Title. 
This is reinforced by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimina- 
tory actions by the federal government. In 1972, following Shannon v. HUD, 436 
F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), HUD established project site selection criteria aimed at 
providing minorities with a wide range of housing opportunities. See 24 C.F.R. 
Part 200, Subpart N (Project Selection Criteria) (1981). The requirements of Title 
VIII and Shannon will have to be respected by Congress and the administration in 
adopting and administering successors to the current federal housing programs. 
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federal authorizing statutes will be. In many states, local govern- 
ments have relied on the specificity of federal statutes to authorize 
them to spend federal dollars for the purposes of the authorizing 
legislation. In the absence of such specific direction, localities may 
have to look to state statutes for the legal ability to engage in 
housing related activities. 
This problem confronted many jurisdictions in the early days of 
the Community Development Block Grant Program. Federal law 
allowed recipient jurisdictions to give property owners grants, or 
low interest loans, to rehabilitate their homes or apartments. State 
constitutions and statutes in many states prohibited gifts or loans to 
private individuals unless in furtherance of a recognized "public 
purpose." The legal definition of public purpose in many states was 
simply not broad enough to include the rehabilitation or repair of 
privately owned housing unless it was part of an urban renewal 
plan or other purpose prescribed by state statutes. Most localities 
were able to obtain legal rulings authorizing them to proceed with 
their rehabilitation grant and loan programs, based on the detailed 
authorization contained in the Housing and Community Develop- 
ment Act and HUD's  regulation^.^^ Federal revenue sharing leg- 
islation, on the other hand, contains much less specificity as to the 
uses to which the shared revenues may be put. These funds must 
generally be spent in accordance with the provisions of state and 
local finance and municipal law. 
A housing block grant program enacted by the current Congress 
could very possibly fall somewhere between the fairly specific 
Community Development Block Grant program enacted in 1974 
and the nonprescriptive federal revenue sharing program. If this is 
the case, it may be an open question in many states as to whether 
the block grant legislation is specific enough, or whether localities 
are narrowly constrained by the spending powers contained in 
their state statutes. 
C. The Impact of Housing Block Grants 
on the Municipal Planning Function 
Municipalities that have been receiving Community Development 
Block Grants have grown accustomed to preparing Housing 
Assistance Plans. The Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974 made the preparation of a Housing Assistance Plan a 
prerequisite for receiving Community Development Block 
32. See, e.g., Opinion No. 74-1120, State Comptroller of New York (Nov. 1, 
1974). 
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Grants. It required legislators to articulate the housing needs of 
the poor; it provided some assurance that Community Develop- 
ment Block Grant recipients would implement housing, as well as 
community development, objectives. Localities were expected to 
"take all actions within their control" to implement their housing 
assistance plans.33 Such actions included, of course, working 
cooperatively with developers and property owners interested in 
applying for the separately funded federal subsidy programs. The 
legislation also provided that HUD allocate federal subsidy funds; 
HUD area offices were authorized to advertise the availability of 
units of various forms of subsidy-new construction, substantial 
rehabilitation, moderate rehabilitation and existing housing- 
roughly in accordance with the needs for these various programs 
spelled out in the housing assistance plans in each allocation area. 
If Congress enacts a housing block grant program and eliminates 
most or all of the current subsidy programs, much of the rationale 
for the housing assistance plan will be removed. Localities are 
likely to be allocated a direct dollar amount for a variety of housing 
programs; the program mix may be subject to their control rather 
than that of the HUD area office. Since many of the same localities 
that are entitled to receive community development block grants 
may be entitled to receive housing block grants as well, there is 
some assurance inherent in the housing block grant concept that 
they will be pursuing housing as well as community development 
objectives. A modified housing assistance plan might well be re- 
quired as part of a locality's application for its housing block grant, 
as opposed to its community development block grant. This raises 
the question of what application and planning requirements Con- 
gress is likely to impose on housing block grant applicants. Some- 
thing akin to the current housing assistance plan may be required if 
Congress decides not to streamline greatly the application process, 
and to require advance local analysis of the housing stock and the 
housing needs of the poor. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that Congress might aban- 
don any requirement that localities applying for federal aid pre- 
pare and adopt any special housing plan." In this event, the normal 
local planning process would be relied on, as supplemented by the 
locality, in its discretion, to chart appropriate directions for those 
grant assisted housing projects. The local master plan, capital 
33. 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(a)(3) (1981). 
34. The requirement that applicants for Community Development Block 
Grants submit a Housing Assistance Plan was deleted from the Small Cities 
Community Development Program in the Fiscal 1982 HUD reauthorization law. 
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budget, operating budget, zoning ordinance, building and housing 
codes, and other supplemental planning processes would become 
the criteria for planning the expenditure of housing block grant 
funds. 
Ironically, however, a flexible housing block grant may lead to a 
greater degree of housing planning at the local level. Given a broad 
range of choices for spending funds that are received by local 
government, local lenders may insist on more precise housing 
needs analyses, market studies, housing condition reports, and 
demographic data. It might be decided that the conscientious 
exercise of the municipality's additional housing responsibility will 
require more reliable information to justify decisions. The desire 
of many local officials to be able to account to the public for their 
decisions heightens the need for, and should increase local interest 
in, professional housing planning. 
D. State and Local Administrative and 
Technical Capacity and 
Housing Block Grants 
Perhaps the greatest impact of a shift to housing block grants 
would be felt at the level of the line agencies that would be called 
upon to design and implement initiatives to replace the eliminated 
federal programs. These agencies and their managers and staffs 
will bear the initial responsibility for program design and, ulti- 
mately, responsibility for program execution. These programs 
must face the significant challenge of attracting the participation of 
private developers and financial institutions, if they are to leverage 
private resources with public funds. They must also reduce the 
long-term risk inherent in developing assisted housing to a level 
acceptable to the involved political leaders and the private institu- 
tions. The extent of this challenge differs markedly, depending on 
whether the staff is designing methods of replacing federal new 
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs or the moder- 
ate scale rehabilitation and rental supplement programs. Where 
long-term financing for extremely costly construction and rehabil- 
itation is required, the subsidies must be deeper, more sophisti- 
cated, and supported by other insurance, secondary market and 
related programs, that are themselves highly complex. 
MII. Facing Program Design Issues 
The outline of issues below raises many of the critical questions 
that must be addressed by state and local officials in designing their 
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own housing subsidy progams. The deeper the subsidy and the 
longer the term of financing required, the more difficult these 
questions will be to answer. 
A. Designing Financing Mechanisms 
Housing subsidy issues can be divided into two general categories: 
availability of mortgage financing and the cost of developing, 
financing, and operating housing. Housing subsidy programs must 
be designed both to lower the cost of housing and to guarantee the 
availability of mortgage credit. Unless the underwriting criteria of 
private and public lending institutions are met, cost-reducing sub- 
sidy programs will not succeed, because construction financing and 
permanent mortgage loans will not be available. These considera- 
tions raise four issues that state and local governments would have 
to address in deciding how to allocate their housing block grant 
resources. 
Should the development cost of housing (land, capital improve- 
ments, labor materials, overhead, or construction financing) be 
written down through a local financial contribution? By reducing 
any of the development costs, the final per unit cost will be reduced 
as will the amount, and thus the cost, of permanent financing. Is 
this the proper focus of block grant assistance? How much would 
the price have to be written down to reach the intended target 
population? 
Should a direct post-occupancy operating subsidy program be 
established to reduce the operating and maintenance costs of 
housing to the occupant? How deep would the operating subsidy 
have to be to reach the intended population? 
Should the cost of financing be subsidized? The interest rate 
under the old Section 236 program was written down to one 
percent to make housing affordable to moderate-income house- 
holds. To reach low-income households, the government had to 
pay a rental supplement, on their behalf, to the owner. Even with 
these deep subsidies, countless Section 236 projects went into 
default because tenant rents were unable to cover the increased 
cost of housing as inflation reached the double-digit level in the 
1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~  At today's mortgage rates, the cost of subsidizing the 
35. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 236 RENTAL 
HOUSING: AN EVALUATION WITH LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, REPORT O THE 
CONGRESS (Jan. 10, 1978). 
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mortgage interest rate to 1 percent would be double the cost 
involved when the Section 236 program was initiated. 
Should the availability of financing for housing be the target of 
housing block grant expenditures? Local, regional or state govern- 
ments can establish insurance funds, participation loan programs, 
secondary mortgage markets, and a variety of other mechanisms 
designed to attract private financing for housing. Perhaps the 
major technical issue that officials must address is whether the 
state and local governments have the resources and the capacity to 
attract private mortgage capital to the projects that they wish to 
assist financially. The staff must soberly assess the locality's 
chances of success in attracting private financing. Where it is overly 
costly or complex to induce mortgage lenders to provide either 
construction financing or permanent loans, the locality must then 
rely on public or private mortgage insurance, the secondary mar- 
ket, and other supportive programs to make mortgage funds avail- 
able. Cost cutting subsidy programs must, in turn, be designed to 
fit the criteria of these supportive programs. 
These four separate techniques can, of course, be used in com- 
bination to bring the cost of housing into the range affordable by 
the target population. As the technical staff studies methods of 
combining subsidy techniques, several questions will inevitably be 
raised. Which of the techniques are the most cost-effective in the 
short term? What are the cost consequences of each technique 
over the long term? What is the exposure to risk? What existing 
local, regional, and state programs already exist that can be used to 
lower housing costs before using block grant funds? Can tax ex- 
empt financing, real estate tax exemption, syndication of tax 
advantages, changes in zoning, density bonuses, private mortgage 
insurance, the local capital budget, or other resources be used as 
the basis for designing a housing block grant program? When all of 
these cost reducing techniques are combined, will they be ade- 
quate to lower the costs sufficiently to reach low- and moder- 
ate-income households? Will they be free enough of risk, and 
lucrative enough as investments, to attract mortgage financing 
from private or public lending institutions? 
B .  Development Issues 
In addition to designing programs that are financially feasible, 
state and iocal technicians must assure that projects assisted by 
them are developable. If projects are not profitable and if their 
success is not predictable, private developers cannot be induced to 
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build and own them. In the alternative, existing nonprofit, quasi- 
public, or public entities will have to be used, or new ones created, 
to develop desired projects. Such entities may have to receive 
further public subsidies to do what the private sector will not. 
Can the state and local agencies further assist the developer, 
whether private, nonprofit, or public, by amending zoning ordi- 
nances and revising building and fire codes to allow the use of more 
cost-effective, but safe and durable, building products, construc- 
tion techniques, and design types? Localities can encourage more 
cost effective housing design through zoning and code revision. 
They can adopt zoning techniques that allow density bonuses to 
developers willing to market the bonus units to moderate-income 
households. They can perform generic environmental impact 
statements and then review and approve preliminary proposals 
from developers to cut design and engineering costs. Publicly 
owned land can be made available for development, and the public 
power of eminent domain, where allowed, can be used to assist 
developers with site assemblage. Localities can otherwise act to 
foster the level of development desired to fulfill local policy objec- 
tives. 
Once a developable project is designed, the staff must then 
decide how to select a qualified developer, how to monitor that 
developer's performance, how to set and insure compliance with 
housing standards, how to avoid windfall profits and fraud, and 
how to insure that the developer complies with other public objec- 
tives regarding, for example, relocation, labor rates, affirmative 
action, energy conservation, and environmental protection. 
C .  Local Administrative Issues 
A flexible housing block grant program would bring with it new 
opportunities for recipient jurisdictions to coordinate the expendi- 
ture of housing block grant funds with its capital and operating 
budgets. This, in turn, can facilitate interdepartmental coordina- 
tion. The need, in many communities, for supportive programs 
from regional and state governments may lead to the creation of 
new intergovernmental arrangements. 
A shift to the direct allocation of federal housing assistance 
funds to local governments may lead many communities to become 
involved in nontraditional administrative activities and arrange- 
ments. This was certainly the result of the Community Develop- 
ment Block Grant Program that was initiated in 1974. That pro- 
gram led to the hiring of rehabilitation specialists, rehabilitation 
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finance officers, architects, and housing counselors in communities 
that had previously not had such staff positions. In some cases, it 
fostered coordination between the community development agen- 
cies' activities and those of local housing code bureaus. Commu- 
nity development agencies also began planning public service and 
public works programs in conjunction with human resource agen- 
cies and public works departments. 
To the extent that cities have funded physical development 
activities under their community development program, they have 
already addressed the major administrative issues which will arise 
if they receive block grants for housing. This added resource will, 
of course, need to be carefully coordinated with the existing com- 
munity development program, and administered, as is the com- 
munity development program, in close coordination with the func- 
tions of other city departments and agencies. Social services, tax 
assessment administration, permit issuance, zoning planning re- 
views, capital improvements, and code compliance are all gov- 
ernmental functions that can be used in conjunction with commu- 
nity development programs to support and facilitate housing. 
This same opportunity to coordinate housing and community 
development programs may now be extended to states which have 
heretofore not administered community development programs. 
In fiscal year 1982, Congress has given states the option to adminis- 
ter directly the Small Cities Community Development Block 
Grant Program. Where states exercise that option, the possibility 
exists of close coordination of housing and community develop- 
ment programming at the state level. 
Perhaps the greatest potential for administrative change under a 
housing block grant program exists in the area of intergovernmen- 
tal compacts and arrangements. This may be particularly appropri- 
ate if a sufficient scale of operations is to be achieved to justify the 
cost of creating participation loan programs, complicated bank 
pools, mortgage backed security programs, secondary mortgage 
markets, and the issuance of tax exempt bonds. Additionally, the 
magnitude of the need for public subsidy of new construction and 
substantial rehabilitation will inspire a search for all possible 
sources of revenue, authority and resources that can be used to 
supplement block grant funds to effect affordable housing 
strategies. State-local and inter-local arrangements regarding 
roads, sewers, sewage treatment, water supply, public transit, 
social service, and other public services and improvements may be 
essential to the success of assisted housing strategies. 
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IX. Housing Allowances and 
Cash Transfer Payments 
With modest exceptions, HUD historically has administered pro- 
grams aimed at increasing or improving the supply of housing for 
the poor. To encourage developers to build, and landlords to 
rehabilitate housing for low-income households, Congress pro- 
vided that subsidies would be paid directly to the project owner 
and attach to the housing units subsidized. The guarantee of sub- 
sidy payments, secured by a contract between the owner and 
HUD, was designed to enable owners to obtain financing to build 
or rehabilitate residential buildings. Eligible tenants could come 
and go over the life of the contract, benefiting from reasonably 
priced housing built or rehabilitated to meet property standards 
defined by HUD. 
Housing allowances, in contrast, are designed to bolster the 
demand for. housing. They are typically paid to eligible tenants in 
the form of a cash transfer payment designated specifically for 
meeting shelter costs. HUD has administered three programs that 
moved in the direction of housing allowances. Two such programs 
were created in 1965. Under the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of that year, Congress created the Rent Supplement and 
Section 23 Leased Housing Program, both of which tied subsidies 
to the incomes of eligible tenants." The Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974 established the Section 8 Existing Pro- 
gram, which also utilized an income related subsidy to be paid on 
behalf of eligible occupants of existing, standard housing units.37 
None of these programs, however, involved direct payments of 
housing allowances to the assisted household. They relied on 
intermediaries, the local public housing agency or project owner, 
to receive and administer the funds. 
Congress had stopped short of legislating a housing allowance 
program, with subsidies to be paid directly to low-income families, 
for a variety of reasons. It was feared that allowances would be 
difficult to administer, would artificially inflate housing prices and 
would be used to pay for, and thus subsidize, substandard housing. 
It was also thought that allowances would have no perceptible 
effect on the supply of housing for the poor. The perceived benefits 
of the housing allowance approach were several. It was seen as less 
expensive, on a per unit basis, than providing newly constructed or 
36. See notes 20 and 21 supra and accompanying text. 
37. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 supra note 27. 
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substantially rehabilitated housing to the poor. If properly man- 
aged, it might be used to encourage better maintenance of older 
housing. To some, it was thought more equitable to spread housing 
subsidy dollars broadly through an allowance program, than to 
reward a fortunate few with costly new and rehabilitated units. 
In the late 1960s the President's Commission on Urban Housing, 
popularly called the Kaiser Commission, reviewed the housing 
allowance debate and recommended the initiation of an ex- 
perimental program to test the concept f~ r the r . '~  Shortly thereaf- 
ter, Congress authorized HUD to establish the Experimental 
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP) .39 After a decade of experi- 
mentation, several conclusions have been reached about housing 
allowances, as tested under three separate EHAP programs.@ 
HUD has determined that 20 percent of all United States house- 
holds have incomes that make them eligible for a housing allow- 
ance program. Under the allowance experiment, it was found that 
a majority of the eligible households lived in substandard housing; 
most had high rent burdens. Participation in the experimental 
programs was generally high among most income and ethnic 
groups, when the program was administered without housing stan- 
dards. When housing standards were introduced as a program 
requirement, participation declined markedly. More stringent 
housing standards disproportionately reduced the participation of 
minority families, large households, and poorer people. Predict- 
ably, the poorer the quality of the dwelling unit, the less likely the 
household occupying it is to participate. If housing standards are 
eliminated, participation levels increase, but about two-thirds of 
the households receiving the allowance will live in substandard 
housing. As the level of payment increases, so does participation. 
On the average, the allowance program costs $1,150 per household 
in 1974 dollars: $900 for allowances and $250 for administration. 
HUD concluded that allowances do not artificially inflate the price 
of housing, nor do they stimulate the construction or major repair 
of housing for the poor. 
Based on these conclusions, it may be fairly stated that housing 
allowances are, at best, only a partial response to the housing 
38. A DECENT HOME, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN 
HOUSING 14 (1969). 
39. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, $504, 
84 Stat. 1770, 1784 (1971). 
40. EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM, CONCLUSIONS: THE 1980 
REPORT (February, 1980). 
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problems of low-income households. Where the supply of housing 
is inadequate, where deterioration is widespread, and where costs 
are particularly high, the allowance approach is simply not enough 
to redress the major shelter needs of the poor. If housing standards 
are not used, participation will be acceptable, but public funds will 
be used to subsidize substandard housing. If decent, safe, and 
sanitary conditions are required, participation among the occu- 
pants of substandard housing will decline markedly. In either 
event, allowances are not deep enough to cause the market to 
increase the supply of housing for the poor. 
X. Cash Transfer Payments 
As HUD and Congress continue to experiment with the provision 
of housing allowances directly to the poor, they begin to obscure 
the difference between the housing programs administered by 
HUD and the cash transfer, or welfare, programs administered by 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). National 
welfare policy has been directed to a variety of objectives discern- 
ible as early as 1909 in the While House Conference on Children. 
One of these objectives is aiming federal aid at maintaining a 
suitable home for the rearing of children. Federal social welfare 
legislation has consistently provided for the provision of "mainte- 
nance services" designed to help recipients sustain or strengthen 
family life and to restore them to a condition of self-support or 
self-care. Taxpayer groups have favored programs and policies 
that discourage households from obtaining or continuing on relief. 
In recent years, it has become an overt purpose of Congress to 
reduce social service expenditures by getting people off the welfare 
rolls. This objective was to be achieved by a variety of techniques, 
including the provision of "developmental services" and the crea- 
tion of job incentive programs both designed to help recipients 
achieve self-support and to reduce their dependency on the gov- 
ernment. Social work philosophy also favors recipient self- 
determination out of a motivation to see less reliance on the public 
sector and greater personal growth and responsibility within the 
family unit. 
Out of this emphasis on self-dependency evolved the "money 
payment principle," which is a landmark in social legislation. The 
Social Security Act, passed in 1935," established the categorical 
- - 
41. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1936). 
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assistance benefit as a money payment to be made directly, without 
restriction, to the eligible recipient. The assumption is that finan- 
cial need does not abrogate the individual's right and responsibility 
to handle money to which he or she is entitled by reason of his or 
her needy status. Although the Social Security Act has been 
amended on many occasions, the unrestricted money payment is 
still the controlling principle behind the federal system of public 
assistance. This principle applies, of course, to the payment of 
rent. With limited exceptions, recipients must be unfettered in 
their right and responsibility to utilize their grants to pay rent and 
their other expenses of living. 
The money payment principle has prevented departments of 
social services from responding to suggestions by landlords that 
additional housing would be opened up to recipients, and better 
quality housing provided, if payments on behalf of recipients were 
made directly to the owners. Recent efforts to widen the depart- 
ments' direct payment authority have been thwarted by legal ser- 
vices attorneys and representatives of recipients who argue that 
direct payments markedly lessen the landlord's incentive to pro- 
vide services and make repairs, and limit the freedom of recipients 
to take effective recourse when services and repairs are not pro- 
vided. 
HHS's unrestricted payment approach provides assistance to 
recipients at or below the minimum standard of living. Recipients 
are subject to the private market where they negotiate rentals with 
only those landlords who can afford to operate their buildings at 
the rent levels that recipients can pay. This frequently results in 
recipient families paying up to 50 percent of their incomes for 
shelter. Further, there are virtually no administrative mechanisms 
in place to insure that the shelter purchased provides a suitable 
home. 
Despite the fact that billions of public dollars flow into the 
housing markets under HHS cash transfer programs, the words 
"shelter" and "housing" are singularly absent from the social 
security legislation drafted over the years by the congressional 
committees that design HHS's programs and appropriate funds for 
their implementation. The deliberations of those critical commit- 
tees are uncluttered and uninfluenced by the representatives of 
builders, banks, neighborhood organizations, tenant organiza- 
tions, public housing authorities, and community development 
agencies. Instead, the attention of housing lobbyists is riveted on 
the activities of those separate housing, banking, and urban affairs 
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committees where national housing policy is made and programs 
to realize the elusive statutory goal of "a.decent home and suitable 
living environment for every American family" are conceived and 
given birth. 
In the years ahead, these congressional housing committees 
must confront the increasingly popular notion of reducing federal 
expenditures by increasing HUD7s reliance on housing allow- 
ances. As they do, they will face a dilemma of significant propor- 
tions. They will be called upon to distinguish the HUD housing 
allowance from the HHS cash transfer payment, much of which is 
used to pay for shelter for welfare families. The distinction, of 
course, rests on HUD7s historical commitment to a "decent home 
for all Americans." This commitment, in turn, will create great 
pressure to tie housing allowances to housing standards. The 
EHAP experiment, however, shows that such a link drastically 
reduces participation among those most in need of housing assist- 
ance. This, then, argues for increasing the level of the allowance 
which, EHAP tells us, tends to increase participation. But, to 
increase allowance levels is to place a greater financial burden on 
the federal treasury. Since the high cost of housing programs was 
what began the reexamination of federal housing policy in the first 
instance, such a result may be unacceptable. One option is to 
reduce the number of households eligible for the housing allow- 
ance program. If this is achieved by lowering the income limits, the 
households eligible for HUD7s housing allowance program may be 
nearly indistinguishable from those receiving living and shelter 
allowances from HHS. The temptation, in the current political 
climate, to celebrate that result by simply eliminating HUD sub- 
sidy programs for the poor may be too great to resist. 
XI. New Generation of Federal Housing Programs 
The Supreme Court in Helvering and Fullilove silenced all echoes 
of the debate among the founders over the extent to which Con- 
gress was empowered to tax and spent in the national interest. 
Fullilove was decided in 1980, just as the debate over the extent to 
which the federal fisc should be relied on to solve social problems 
reached a crescendo. With the election of Ronald Reagan and the 
advent of supply-side economic theory, the broad spending powers 
that Congress is now recognized to possess seem destined, at least 
for a time, to be exercised much less vigorously in pursuing the goal 
of a decent home for all Americans. Alexander Hamilton had 
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argued persuasively for a broad interpretation of the general wel- 
fare clause. Yet, he would have understood this result. On the 
power to tax he wrote: 
There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive 
information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy so 
much as the business of taxation. The man who understands these principles 
best will be least likely to resort to aggressive expedients, or to sacrifice any 
particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demon- 
strated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least 
burdensome." 
The decision to reduce federal spending for housing in the 
current fiscal year, by nearly 50 percent, was part of the general 
reaction to double digit inflation, precipitated in significant part by 
federal borrowing to finance the budget deficit, and for loans to, 
and sponsored by, the federal government. In the decade prior to 
the inauguration of President Reagan, the amount of annual bor- 
rowing for these purposes increased from $33.5 billion to $156.9 
billion. "Taxes, like necessity," Hume wrote, "when carried too 
far, destroy industry by engendering despair; . . . . An attentive, 
disinterested legislature will observe the point when the emolu- 
ment ceases and the prejudice begins."43 
That point has apparently been reached for the Congress, the 
Secretary of HUD, and the President's Housing Commission. 
Their recent actions bespeak less federal spending for housing, 
greater reliance on the private market for solutions, and more use 
of direct assistance to those in need. In forwarding his Interim 
Report to the President, Chairman McKenna of the Housing 
Commission wrote, "We support your commitment to control the 
growth of government spending and your determination to arrest 
the pace of government spending which fuels the fires of inflation 
and high interest rates-common enemies of a truly healthy hous- 
ing market. "" 
The Commission recommended that the "primary federal pro- 
gram for helping low-income families achieve decent housing be a 
consumer-oriented housing assistance grant."" The Commission 
proposed that this housing allowance approach replace new con- 
struction programs entirely, that eligibility be limited to "house- 
holds with very low incomes," and that recipients "should be 
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (A. Hamilton). 
43. D. HUME, OF TAXES. 
44. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  HOUSING, INTERIM REPORT (1980). 
45. Id. at 6. 
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required to live in decent housing in order to qualify for 
assistance. . . ."46 Recognizing that housing allowances do not 
increase the supply of housing, the Commission stated its belief 
that a new federal housing policy should include "reliance on the 
experience and flexibility of state and local agencies to finance and 
produce housing, including both rehabilitation and new 
constr~ction."~~ The report also adopts the "trickledown" theory 
of housing occupancy. It suggests that its recommendations which 
serve to increase housing supply for middle- and upper-income 
Americans will enable the poor to find and afford better housing. 
HUD, which provided staff assistance to the President's Hous- 
ing Commission, endorsed the Commission's emphasis on housing 
allowances in submitting its budget proposals for fiscal year 1983 to 
the Office of Management and Budget in October of 1981.'@ The 
HUD proposal seeks an additional thirty percent cut in funding for 
housing assistance, and places nearly exclusive emphasis on sub- 
sidies for existing housing. HUD proposed a housing voucher 
program involving a direct subsidy payment to individuals as the 
cornerstone of future federal housing assistance to lower income 
households. Only 10,000 units of new construction would be 
assisted--down 93 percent from the fiscal year 1981 program. The 
voucher program would have to meet housing standards and eligi- 
bility would be limited to households with very low incomes. 
HUD also proposed a $200 billion housing rehabilitation 
block grant program which would be supported by a 40,000 unit 
set-aside of housing vouchers. This represents the first serious and 
formal proposal to initiate a housing block grant program since the 
1976 Hills proposal. The Hills proposal was a long-term, full- 
purpose block grant program; it contrasts markedly with the cur- 
rent HUD recommendation which is patterned after the short- 
term, limited purpose model. 
XII. Conclusion 
These proposals represent an abrupt change in the course of fed- 
eral housing policy. For four and a half decades the trend was to 
spend larger and larger sums of money on a variety of programs. 
These initiatives were built on the belief that achieving decent 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 5. 
48. See note 4, supra. 
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housing for the poor required highly prescriptive federal programs 
to increase the supply of newly constructed and substantially reha- 
bilitated housing. Proposals being given serious consideration in 
Washington today represent an entirely new generation of thought 
about the role of the federal government in housing. The shift in 
emphasis to subsidizing existing housing, providing housing allow- 
ances directly to the poor, and transferring resources and responsi- 
bility to state and local governments may mark the end of the 
expansive use of the federal spending power for low-income hous- 
ing. It may also herald the beginning of a new succession of 
experiments that rely much less on the Article I, Section 8 tax and 
spending powers over which Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson 
argued so strenuously. As a new era of federal housing policy 
begins, the debate will center not on the extent of the federal 
spending power, but rather on the extent to which that power 
ought to be exercised to assure adequate shelter for needy Amer- 
icans. 
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